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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ings are consistent with those made by it in other cases, is clearly beyond
our [the Supreme Court) province."2 3
Judicial review of opinions of administrative agencies is provided to
assure that due process will be followed and that no arbitrary or un-
founded decisions will be made. Once the court oversteps these bounds,
it is acting outside its realm of authority and invading an area set aside
by Congress to be decided by an administrative agency acting in a quasi-
legislative capacity.
Casey Cooper
LABOR LAW: UNIONS ARE ENTITLED TO NAMES AND
ADDRESSES OF EMPLOYEES ELIGIBLE TO VOTE IN
A REPRESENTATION ELECTION ORDERED OR
APPROVED BY A REGIONAL DIRECTOR
In two separate instances, prior to representation elections, employers
sent anti-union letters to their employees, and denied the unions' requests
for employees' names and addresses so that they might answer the em-
ployers' letters and mail campaign material to the employees.' After losing
the elections, the unions sought to have the elections set aside on the
ground that the employers' refusals to furnish employee names and ad-
dresses interfered with the elections.2 The National Labor Relations Board
ruled that an employer must file the names and addresses of all employees
eligible to vote in the election with the Regional Director within seven
days after a representation election is ordered or approved. The Regional
Director shall then make such information available to all parties involved.
Failure to comply with this requirement will be grounds for setting aside
an election whenever proper objections are filed.3
The rationale for the Board's ruling was the "laboratory conditions" prin-
ciple of General Shoe Corporation,4 in which the Board stated:
In election proceeings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
23272 U.S. 658, 663 (1926).
1The first case, Excelsior Underwear, Inc., and the second case, K. L. Kellogg
& Sons, were consolidated and heard together, 5 Cci LAB. L. REP. (1966 CCH
Lab. Cas.) 5 20180 (N.L.R.B. 1966) (hereinafter referred to as Excelsior).
2 The unions also charged that the letters contained false and coercive ma-
terial in violation of § 8(a) (1) of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT. The
Board found the letters to be legitimate campaign propaganda.
3The ruling has the following limitations: first, it is inapplicable to cases
occurring thirty days from the date of the present decision, Excelsior, supra note 1,
n.5; second, disclosure is excluded in expedited elections, Excelsior, supra note
1, n.14.
4 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the un-
inhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish
those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they
have been fulfilled.5 (Emphasis added.)
In reaffirming this principle in the present case the Board said:
[We regard it as the Board's function to conduct elections in
which employes have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or
against representation under circumstances that are free not only
from interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act,
but also from other elements that prevent or impede a free and
reasoned choice. Among the factors that undoubtedly tend to
impede such a choice is a lack of information with respect to
one of the choices available. In other words, an employee who
has had an effective opportunity to hear the arguments con-
cerning representation is in a better position to make a more
fully informed and reasoned choice. Accordingly, we think that
it is appropriate for us to remove the impediment to commu-
nication to which our new rule is directed.
Before this ruling, non-employee 7 organizers' access to all employees was
limited by an employer's lawful no-solicitation rule and no-distribution
rule, provided that alternate channels of communication were reasonably
adequate to reach the employees." Although alternate channels of com-
munication exist, peculiar geographic circumstances 9 must be considered
to determine if the normal contacts are adequate. Furthermore, the rule
preventing union solicitation or distribution of literature must be the
result of the employer's desire to protect his legitimate property interest
and not an attempt to obstruct the employees' statutory right of self-
organization.'" There is a conscious effort to balance the conflicting inter-
ests of the employees' right to organize and the employer's right to con-
trol the use of his property."
The alternate channels of communication rule has been criticized be-
cause it prevents employees from hearing all arguments for and against
unionization which, in turn, prevents the employees from making an
5 Id. at 127.
6 Excelsior, supra note 1, p.25 404.
' Employees and nonemployees are distinguished when considering no-solici-
tation and no-distribution rules. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105(1956).8 Ibid., Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960).
9 NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Co., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); NLRB
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
30 NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1948).
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informed and reasoned choice whether they desire union representation 1 2
A further argument is that channels of communication available to the
employer are more effective in persuading employees than alternate chan-
nels of communication left to the union,13 and that such inequality im-
pedes an informed and reasoned choice.14
In the present cases, the Board held the alternate channels of com-
munication were ineffective to insure adequate contact with all employees.
The Board considered access to all employees essential to expose them to
all arguments concerning unionization and to insure a more informed and
reasoned employee choice for or against union representation. To insure
this complete exposure, the Board took the position that it properly could
require disclosure although other channels of communication were avail-
able to the union. Alternate channels of communication were held "rele-
vant only when the opportunity to communicate made available by the
Board would interfere with a significant employer interest," 15 such as
control of the use of property.
Continuing, the Board held that secrecy of employee names and ad-
dresses is not a significant employer interest.
Perhaps the Board's ruling was most significant in making the distinc-
tion that:
[E]ven assuming that there is some legitimate employer interest
in non-disclosure, we think it relevant that the subordination of
that interest which we here required is limited to a situation in
which employee interests in self-organization are shown to be
substantial. For, whenever an election is directed (the pre-
condition to disclosure) the Regional Director has found that
a real question concerning representation exists; when the em-
ployer consents to an election, he has impliedly admitted this
fact.61
This test of substantial employee interest might be extended to further
subordinate employer interests since the Board has indicated that future
doctrine in the area of plant access may depend upon the effectiveness of
the present disclosure ruling.'7 Depending upon their evaluation of the
effectiveness of the disclosure requirement, the Board could possibly
12Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
The National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAv. L. REV. 38 (1964); Comment, 72
YALE L J. 1243 (1963).
13 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953) (dissent).
14 The Board apparently shares these opinions to some extent, since, in a prior
case, it described alternate channels of communication available to one union as
"catch-as-catch-can." The May Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied,
316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
15 Excelsior, supra note 1, p 25407.
16 Excelsior, supra note 1, p. 25407.
17 General Electric Co., 5 CCII LAB. L REP. (1966 CCH Lab. Cas.) 520181(Feb. 4, 1966).
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